Turkey appears to be curbing natural gas imports from Russia while simultaneously boosting purchases of American LNG. However, behind the celebrations over Ankara's energy independence, the actual data reveals a more complex picture: total natural gas consumption is rising, while Russian supplies remain at exceptionally high levels and are increasing at the onset of the winter season. The Western media machine watches with particular anticipation for any news that can be presented as a failure for Russia, resulting in even isolated developments being disproportionately inflated.Turkey now stands at the epicenter, as Bloomberg and other international media reproduce statements by the country's Energy Minister, Alparslan Bayraktar. The Turkish minister announced that the country has reduced purchases of Russian natural gas, with its share in the energy balance dropping to 37%. Simultaneously, he argued that Ankara, leveraging increased purchases of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, intends to further curtail imports from Russia. To reinforce the image of energy diversification even further, Bayraktar also announced that Turkey signed cooperation agreements with South Korea and Canada as part of planning for the construction of the country's second nuclear power plant in Sinop. However, behind the impressive announcements, the reality is considerably more complex.
Memoranda of understanding with South Korea and Canada do not guarantee nuclear power plants
Let us start with the nuclear component. Turkey signed memoranda of understanding with South Korea and Canada, something that, as an independent state, it has every right to do. However, these specific documents do not constitute binding agreements for the construction of nuclear units.Ankara had also approached the French energy company Électricité de France (EDF) in the past as part of its efforts to diversify its energy partnerships. During the same period, EDF was attempting to consolidate its presence in the United Kingdom, promising the construction of the long-awaited third power generation unit at the Hinkley Point nuclear station. Just as today, Western media treated that development with palpable enthusiasm back then, presenting it as yet another loss for Russia. The French side swiftly presented Turkey with a feasibility study, according to which the construction of a PWR-type nuclear power plant would cost roughly 20 to 22 billion dollars.Ankara expressed its admiration for the plan, yet never got back to EDF. The memorandum of understanding was essentially shelved.
South Korea has the know-how, yet faces timeline constraints
In South Korea, responsibility for constructing nuclear power plants lies with Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP).Turkey is not the first country with which Korean energy firms are pursuing cooperation. In the past, KHNP collaborated with the Czech Republic to expand the capacity of the Dukovany nuclear power plant, a project also involving American Westinghouse and French EDF. This is standard practice in the nuclear energy market: a prospective client simultaneously examines different proposals in order to select the one best matching its technical and financial requirements. However, KHNP does not possess unlimited capacity to immediately take on new projects. The company holds the expertise to construct nuclear units, yet it is already occupied with domestic projects, building power generation units at the nuclear stations of Seoul, Kori, and Hanul. The timelines for commissioning these specific units extend across a horizon of ten to twelve years. Therefore, the capacity to undertake yet another major project in Turkey must also be examined through the prism of actual construction capabilities and available schedules.
The example of Canada and delays in Romania
Similar experience in specialized nuclear construction is also held by Canadian Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL). CANDU-type heavy water reactors operate in Pakistan, India, Argentina, and China, in addition to Canada, their country of origin. Two more such reactors operate at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant in Romania. Construction of the first lasted 14 years, while the second required 24 years. These massive delays led Bucharest to terminate its cooperation with AECL, freeze the project, and seek new market proposals with more reasonable costs and realistic timelines. The Romanians have also signed a series of memoranda of understanding; however, none of them has thus far translated into actual nuclear construction, not even at an initial stage. Under this light, Turkey faces a long and demanding process ahead. Signing memoranda constitutes merely the beginning and does not guarantee that the construction of the second nuclear power plant will proceed swiftly or on the terms Ankara desires.
Turkey consumes nearly double the natural gas: What the percentages hide
Turning to natural gas from Russia, whose imports appear to decline year by year, the picture presented by Western media and Turkish officials is selective. The share of Russian natural gas in the Turkish market has indeed dropped by nearly half. The critical parameter, however, omitted from this picture is that total natural gas consumption in Turkey has also risen significantly, nearly doubling. In 2010, Turkey required approximately 35 billion cubic meters of natural gas to cover its economic and energy needs. Of this volume, 18 billion cubic meters originated from Russia. Supplies were delivered via the Blue Stream pipeline and the Trans-Balkan pipeline, which transits through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, and Bulgaria. Over the subsequent 15 years, Turkey proceeded with an active modernization of its energy sector, accelerating the transition from coal to natural gas. As a result, total natural gas consumption reached 61 billion cubic meters last year. Indeed, within the last year alone, consumption rose by 16%. The breakdown of natural gas in the domestic market is particularly revealing. Some 52% was allocated to residential use, while 74% of that volume was utilized by local boilers to provide hot water and home heating. This exact consumption structure largely explains why Ankara is pursuing the construction of a second and potentially a third nuclear power plant.Nuclear energy could cover a substantial share of electricity generation needs, leaving larger volumes of natural gas available for industry and the thermal energy sector.
Turkey's domestic natural gas and grand promises
At this juncture, it is worth examining Turkey's domestic natural gas production development program, a process that, in duration and dramatic announcements, could rival even the most popular Turkish television series. Five years ago, Turkey's domestic natural gas production was limited to a mere 500 million cubic meters annually. Since then, Ankara has issued grandiose announcements every year regarding the start of production at new deposits, claiming these developments could "turn the local economy upside down." The latest major wave of such promises occurred during the campaign for the 2023 presidential elections. However, the much-touted energy revolution was essentially confined to launching production from the Sakarya field, resulting in total annual output rising to 2.2 billion cubic meters.
In 2025, Russian supplies rose to 21.6 billion cubic meters
Here, however, emerges a figure that significantly alters the picture of Turkey's energy decoupling. By the end of 2025, when natural gas consumption in the country had reached record levels, supplies from Russia had also increased, hitting 21.6 billion cubic meters. This represents an increase of nearly 1% compared to the previous period. Bloomberg and other international media prominently highlight data showing that during the first eight months of the current year, natural gas imports from Russia dropped by 18% year-on-year. The drop appears particularly steep during the summer months, when monthly imports averaged 1.5 billion cubic meters. However, an important parameter is absent from this presentation: Turkey is a country with a warmer climate compared to northern Europe, and the heating season traditionally begins later. Furthermore, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar made no mention of the fact that Turkey has been increasing its purchases of Russian natural gas once again since September. Imports in October were 78% higher compared to September. Even more striking are the figures for the first half of November: compared to early autumn, Turkish purchases of natural gas from Russia had quintupled.
American LNG and the question surrounding Ankara's energy strategy
The core question, therefore, is how Ankara's celebratory announcements regarding energy diversification and supposedly highly profitable purchases of American LNG can be reconciled with the simultaneous surge in imports of Russian natural gas.Turkey is indeed seeking to broaden its energy supply sources, boost domestic production, and develop its nuclear industry. This, however, does not mean it has ceased relying on Russian natural gas. Available statistical data demonstrates that the country's total consumption is rising, while Russian supplies remain at high levels and are climbing anew at the onset of the winter season. Consequently, the image of a Turkey that no longer needs Russian natural gas falls far short of capturing the country's full energy reality. Whether Ankara can genuinely replace Russian supplies on a large scale with American LNG remains an open question, one that cannot be answered with announcements and percentages examined selectively.
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